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CALIFORNIA’S REDD RUBBERSTAMP: 
AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS, BUT 
AT WHAT COST? 
Ryan Mock* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Peru, an unscrupulous Australian businessman has allegedly 
conned remote indigenous groups into signing over the rights to their 
forests in exchange for promises of an economic bonanza.1 The people, 
accustomed to earning roughly one dollar per day, were promised 
thirty.2 However, they were apparently unaware that they were signing 
over the rights to their forest for 100 years, and over a year later the 
people had not received a penny.3 
In the village of Quara Quara, Brazil, a man was arrested while 
attempting to repair his mother’s damaged house.4 His crime? Chopping 
down a tree from the lands his people, the Guarani Indians, had lived on 
for generations.5 He spent eleven days in a jail an hour’s canoe ride 
away and was eventually forced to leave his home because he could no 
longer hunt and gather plants in the forest.6 
                                                                                                                                         
* Ryan Mock graduated from the George Washington Law School with his Juris 
Doctorate in 2015, capping a varied academic career that includes a Bachelors of Sports 
Media from the University of Canberra and a Masters of Public Administration from 
the Evans School of Public Affairs at the University of Washington. He’s a native 
northwesterner, though he currently works for the Department of Interior’s Office of the 
Inspector General in Washington, DC. 
1Mariana Sanchez, ‘Carbon pirate’ acquires Amazon resources, ALJAZEERA, (Dec. 29, 
2012) http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/americas/carbon-pirate-acquires-amazon-
resources. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Mark Shapiro, GM’s Money Trees, MOTHER JONES, (Nov. 2009) 
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2009/11/gms-money-trees. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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In Papua New Guinea, an indigenous leader named Abalie Wape 
was threatened by police to surrender the rights to his tribe’s forest.7 The 
police came at night, they held Wape at gunpoint, and forced him to sign 
his tribe’s property away.8 
The link between these three stories is the international carbon 
trading market. Each of these atrocities against indigenous people in 
well-forested parts of the world was spurred on by the promise of wealth 
from rich western nations potentially interested in investing in carbon 
markets. Each of these stories also comes from a remote portion of the 
globe, difficult to carefully monitor by the international programs that 
generally oversee carbon markets; programs like the United Nation’s 
REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) 
programs.9 
Over 6,500 miles away from Quara Quara, the state of California 
has passed legislation, and regulations have been promulgated, to set up 
a carbon-trading scheme.10 As part of the regulation, California will 
allow companies to offset some portion of their pollution by purchasing 
carbon credits from the developing world – effectively preserving 
enough forest that will capture enough carbon to offset some portion of 
their carbon emissions.11 
The markets for carbon-credits are complex, and California has 
created a loose rubric for determining what international programs may 
qualify for California’s system.12 However, California has given outright 
acceptance to credits purchased through REDD,13 bypassing the rules 
that any other international program must comply with to have their 
                                                                                                                                         
 7 REDD and violence against indigenous leader in Papua New Guinea, REDD-
MONITOR, (Jan. 15, 2010) http://www.redd-monitor.org/2010/01/15/redd-and-violence-
against-indigenous-leader-in-papua-new-guinea/. 
 8 Id. 
 9 This is not to say REDD programs are specifically responsible for any and all 
problems within the international carbon market world. Nor is REDD the only carbon-
credit certification. For example, the World Wide Fund for Nature created the CDM 
Gold Standard in 2003 as a carbon-mitigation crediting system (see, 
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/). However, REDD is both well-known and the only 
system California has outright accepted for their cap-and-trade scheme and any issues 
surrounding REDD would likely be applicable to any international monitoring system. 
 10 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95991. 
 11 Id. 
 12 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95992. 
 13 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95993. 
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carbon-credits accepted.14 These “sector-based” credits15 can be used for 
up to one-fourth of a company’s compliance obligation under the 2012 
regulation.16 
The potential problems with overseas carbon-markets are not a 
secret – even INTERPOL has released a statement highlighting some of 
the risks of criminal behavior that come with carbon trading.17 
Unfortunately for California, the state’s hands are somewhat tied when 
it comes to overseeing the markets they would like to allow their 
companies to purchase carbon credits from. Only the United States 
federal government has the Constitutional right to enter treaties with 
foreign jurisdictions,18 and surely such an agreement would be necessary 
to carefully and effectively monitor the generation of carbon credits. 
California unilaterally entering the international carbon market 
through the acceptance of credits from REDD, or any other carbon 
program, is a mistake. The federal government’s Constitutional right to 
enter treaties occupies the entire treaty-making field.19 Thus, California 
does not have the necessary oversight and bargaining ability to assure 
international partner jurisdictions selling carbon credits were efficiently 
and ethically undertaking their responsibilities. 
In the end, California is left with two less-than-perfect solutions. 
The state can limit sector-based carbon credit purchases to domestically 
produced carbon credits (which are already included in the current 
regulations) or it can accept carbon credits from markets that the state 
cannot oversee, leaving ample room for corruption and mismanagement 
overseas.20 
                                                                                                                                         
 14 For the most part, this Note will focus on problems with REDD programs. 
However, the constitutional and other issues that this paper discusses would also likely 
extend to any, or at least most, other carbon credit creation mechanisms. 
 15 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95991. 
 16 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95994(c) (the amount of total carbon-dioxide 
emissions that entails for a given industry or corporation is unclear). 
 17 INTERPOL report warns carbon trading at increased risk of criminal 
exploitation, INTERPOL, (Aug. 2, 2013) http://www.interpol.int/News-and-
media/News/2013/PR090. 
 18 U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 2, CL. 2. 
 19 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 228 (1824) (“The States are unknown to foreign 
nations; their sovereignty exists only with relation to each other and the general 
government”). 
 20 A program that allows companies to purchase credits only from domestic 
sources for offsets would clearly not run into constitutional treaty-making concerns. 
However, such a system would also limit both the number of credits California 
companies would have access to and the impact of the carbon-trading scheme. 
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However, if the federal government were to get involved, 
California and other states with cap-and-trade schemes may be able to 
offer domestic companies ethical, well-regulated options for purchasing 
carbon credits from overseas sources. This solution, while perhaps 
politically unlikely, is the best way to allow states like California to 
institute a cap-and-trade system while also assuring international credits 
are well regulated.21 
This note is not intended to make a value judgment on whether or 
not a carbon market is an effective tool for combatting pollution, climate 
change or any other ill. Rather, this note simply is a look at the issues 
surrounding California’s carbon market, the challenges of effectively 
regulating such a market that allows domestic companies to purchase 
carbon credits generated abroad, and the need for federal intervention if 
carbon trading is to become an effective and ethical reality in the United 
States. 
Part I of this note provides background on REDD as a guide to the 
carbon-credit creation process as well as discusses the potential 
strengths and weaknesses of a REDD-style system. Part II covers the 
history of California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB-32), 
and takes a closer look at the sections pertinent to the discussion at hand. 
Part III lays out the problems California has with effectively negotiating 
with foreign governments, since treaty making powers are reserved for 
the federal government. Part IV offers a solution to the problem – 
namely that the federal government is in the best position to negotiate 
and oversee international production of carbon credits for domestic 
markets. 
                                                                                                                                         
California seems to have made the determination that including international credits 
would be preferable from a policy perspective – otherwise the potential headaches and 
pratfalls of a more-complex international system could have been avoided entirely. 
 21 The politics of creating a framework for approving international carbon credits 
is largely outside the scope of this article. However, there will be a relatively-brief look 
at how past proposals for creating nation-wide carbon markets have fared, and some 
brief discussion of the benefits of creating only a framework for credit approval for 
state markets, rather than a national market. 
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I: A REDD PRIMER 
REDD IN BLACK AND WHITE 
REDD is a mechanism designed to place an economic value on the 
atmospheric carbon captured by natural forests and carbon that would be 
released by a forest through destruction or decay.22 In theory, forest 
destruction trends would be halted or reversed as local governments and 
peoples are monetarily incentivized to preserve and grow forests.23 
REDD is designed not just to preserve forests and the carbon-
filtering properties of the trees, but also to reduce active greenhouse gas 
emissions.24 Deforestation accounts for roughly twenty percent of 
worldwide greenhouse gas emissions.25 The process of cutting down 
forests, as the trees are either burned or decaying, releases carbon 
dioxide.26 Each tree felled not only reduces the capacity for future 
carbon filtration, but also emits carbon dioxide into the atmosphere – a 
“double loss.”27 This double loss could be all the more troubling as 
forest ecosystems store “an estimated fifty percent more carbon than the 
entire amount contained in the earth’s atmosphere.”28 
The metrics used to properly assign value to a forest through 
REDD schemes (including REDD+, the official related United Nations 
program that includes not just deforestation and degradation but also 
conservation, sustainable management and enhancement of forest 
stocks)29 then monetize the carbon stored in a forest and the forest that 
would sink into a forest over time.30 
REDD, and REDD+, have been matters for international climate 
change debate since at least 2005 when a group of developing countries 
                                                                                                                                         
 22 Lisa Hayden, So, what is REDD, anyway? THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, (Dec. 
8, 2010) http://change.nature.org/2010/12/08/so-what-is-redd-anyway/. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Simply REDD, CIFOR, available at 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/media/MediaGuide_REDD.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2015). 
 25 About REDD+, REDD, available at 
http://www.REDD.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 
2015). 
 26 Simply REDD, supra note 24. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Michael L. Brown, Limiting Corrupt Incentives in A Global REDD Regime, 37 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 237, 238 (2010). 
 29 About REDD+, supra note 25. 
 30 Id. 
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proposed the ideas.31 Subsequent United Nations Conventions on 
Climate Change (UNCCC) in Bali in 2007 and Cancun in 2010, mapped 
a way to incorporate REDD into a nationally-driven approach to forest 
preservation and climate change mitigation.32 Details of REDD (and 
REDD+ as a specific UN-approved mechanism) are still under debate 
under the UNFCCC,33 but the December 2009 UN Conference in 
Copenhagen stated that REDD+ was one of the mechanisms that should 
be “immediately establish[ed]” in a post-Kyoto Protocol world.34 
PERCEIVED STRENGTHS OF REDD PROGRAMS 
REDD has the potential to create a very large, uniformly-regulated 
market of carbon credits – possibly up to €45 billion.35 This, coupled 
with the potential that stopping deforestation and degradation could be a 
fairly “low-cost option for lowering [greenhouse gas] emissions,” has 
sparked significant investment by Western countries.36 At the 2010 
UNFCCC in Copenhagen, the United States pledged $1 billion, and five 
other industrialized nations promised an additional $2.5 billion.37 
Norway supplied an addition $1 billion to the Amazon Fund in Brazil, 
and over $250 million to projects run by the United Nations and the 
World Bank to preserve forests in Africa and Guyana. 38 
                                                                                                                                         
 31 International Negotiations, REDD-NET, http://redd-
net.org/themes/international-negotiations (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 32 See Bali Climate Change Conference – December 2007, UNFCCC 
https://unfccc.int/meetings/bali_dec_2007/meeting/6319.php.; see also, See Cancun 
Climate Change Conference – November 2010, UNFCCC 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/meeting/6266.php.; see also, International 
Negotiations, supra note 31. 
 33 Redd+ Negotiations under the UNFCCC: The Story So Far, THE REDD DESK 
http://theredddesk.org/what-is-redd#toc-4. Further discussion of the detailed mechanics 
of REDD and/or REDD+ are generally beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say, 
the process for quantifying the value of a forest is still up for some debate, as are 
potential other issues such as biodiversity and how money filters down to those most 
impacted by forest-use restrictions. 
 34 Copenhagen Accord, at 2, UNFCCC.INT available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf (last accessed Mar. 25, 2015). 
 35 Brown, supra note 28 at 239. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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According to the United Nations, this influx of money into REDD 
programming, or at least REDD readiness development, will lead to 
various non-ecological benefits as well – economic benefits to local 
populations including job creation, enhanced decision-making in land-
use for local citizens and improved governance.39 REDD programs may 
also help protect and promote biodiversity through forest protection.40 
These potential benefits, along with the avoidance of the double 
loss that accompanies forest degradation and deforestation, make the 
REDD program appealing to policy makers.41 Unfortunately, REDD has 
also met resistance and is not without the potential for causing harm.42 
PERCEIVED SHORTFALLS OF REDD PROGRAMS 
The issues surrounding REDD programs stem from three major 
sources: fraud or mismanagement during the credit-creation process, 
ethical issues regarding the treatment of indigenous populations in and 
around forests designated for carbon-credit production, and potential 
problems in the efficacy of measurement techniques used by the 
program. 
FRAUD OR MISMANAGEMENT 
Carbon markets are different from more-traditional economic 
marketplaces in that the commodity being sold does not physically 
exist.43 Instead, companies or countries can purchase “credits” that 
assure a biomass somewhere will soak up a certain amount of carbon-
dioxide emissions.44 These credits are a “legal fiction” rather than a 
traditional commodity.45 
                                                                                                                                         
 39 What are the multiple benefits of REDD+?, REDD PROGRAMME, 
http://www.REDD.org/Multiple_Benefits/tabid/1016/Default.aspx (last accessed Mar. 
25, 2015). 
 40 Brown, supra note 28 at 239. 
 41 About REDD+, supra note 25. 
 42 See, Holly Brentnall, U.N.-REDD program criticized for negative impact on 
Indigenous communities, THEINTERNATIONAL.ORG, (Jan. 28, 2014) 
http://www.theinternational.org/articles/487-REDD-program-criticized-for-negative. 
 43 INTERPOL, supra note 17. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Guide to Carbon Trading Crime, INTERPOL, (June 2013) 
http://www.interpol.int/Media/Files/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Guide-to-
Carbon-Trading-Crime-2013. 
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In any REDD program, a significant amount of wealth is 
transferred, generally to forest-rich developing nations, and corruption 
on the receiving end of that wealth transfer could significantly affect the 
long-term development of the program.46 Currently, the countries with 
the highest rates of deforestation (and thus those most likely to benefit 
from a REDD program), are among the world’s most corrupt.47 
However, it is not just in developing nations with high-levels of 
corruption that potential illegal activity may take place.48 As 
INTERPOL has warned, there is the potential for significant 
manipulation in the carbon market – the lack of quantifiable “goods” 
means the market is perhaps more susceptible to criminal activity.49 
INTERPOL has outlined a list of five broadly-defined illegal activities 
that carbon markets are vulnerable to: 
1) Fraudulent manipulation of measurements used to determine the 
size of a carbon credit project; 
2) Sales of carbon credits from sources that do not exist or do not 
belong to the seller; 
3) Fraudulent or misleading statements about the environmental or 
financial impacts of carbon market investments; 
4) Exploitation of the carbon market to facilitate financial crimes 
(i.e. money laundering or tax fraud); and 
5) Computer crimes to steal carbon credits.50 
While the fourth and fifth issues outlined by INTERPOL are 
certainly concerning, they lie outside the scope of this note. Instead, this 
note will focus on the first three potential drawbacks to carbon markets. 
1. Manipulation of Measurements 
Without extensive oversight, INTERPOL warns that measurements 
to determine how many credits may come from an area can be 
                                                                                                                                         
 46 Brown, supra note 28 at 242. 
 47 Id (citing Nalin Kishor & Richard Damania, Crime and Justice in the Garden 
of Eden: Improving Governance and Reducing Corruption in the Forestry Sector, in 
The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level 89, 90-91 
(J. Edgardo Campos & Sanjay Pradhan eds., 2007)). 
 48 John Vidal, UN’s Forest Protection Scheme at Risk from Organized Crime, 
Experts Warn, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 5, 2009), 
www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/oct/05/un-forest-protection. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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manipulated in two ways – by intentionally reporting incorrect data or 
through more-subtle misrepresentation through data collection or 
“making certain assumptions” when extrapolating data to the entirety of 
a geographic area.51 
Generally, REDD mechanisms require independent third-party 
verification before a project can receive carbon credits, but these 
independent bodies may be susceptible to pressure to manipulate their 
results.52 
Hypothetically, these sorts of practices could result in the following 
type of scenario: an NGO inspector, tasked with verifying 100 hectares 
of rainforest would not personally inspect the entire area. Rather, he 
would verify portions, extrapolate the data based on a pre-approved 
process and determine how many tons of carbon that area can capture. If 
the inspector is shown areas that could capture more carbon than others, 
the data may be distorted and the inspector could validate more credits 
for the area than it can sustain. Thus, those selling the credits would be 
able to sell more credits for more carbon than the area could actually 
hold. And, since the credit itself is intangible and it is impossible to 
determine which credits are actually being offset, it would be very 
difficult to spot the error in the process. 
In reality, a situation very similar to the above occurred in 2008 – 
the UN suspended two major verification agencies after finding 
significant deficiencies in their monitoring process including 
inconsistencies in verifications for a single project.53 Both organizations 
were suspended by the UN for a matter of months, adjusted their 
practices and were reinstated.54 While this may appear to be a success-
story for the UN’s oversight of the crediting process, INTERPOL says 
the affair also highlights the difficulties in monitoring the organizations 
that verify projects.55 
                                                                                                                                         
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Mark Schapiro, Conning the Climate: Inside the Carbon-Trading Shell Game, 
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, (Feb. 2010). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Guide to Carbon Trading Crime, INTERPOL, (June 2013) available at, 
http://www.interpol.int/Media/Files/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Guide-to-
Carbon-Trading-Crime-2013 (last visited March 25, 2015). 
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2. Sales of Fictional Credits 
One of the major difficulties in regulating carbon rights, and 
thereby carbon credits, is the fact that the rights to the actual land and/or 
trees can be separated from the rights to the carbon credits generated.56 
This means an unscrupulous land-owner may be able to sell the same 
carbon credits through multiple foreign carbon exchanges, each with 
differing regulatory schemes.57 
California itself has seen a case in which an individual fraudulently 
sold credits. In United States v. Sholtz, Anne Sholtz of California was 
charged with defrauding a New York company out of $3.5 million.58 
Sholtz was found to have sold $12.5 million of fictional credits to the 
New York company, with the promise to resell those credits for $17.5 
million later on.59 In the end, she paid the company only $9 million.60 
Similarly, INTERPOL has acknowledged a case in which “people 
purchased forested land with boundaries that either did not exist or were 
poorly marked.”61 These lands were in remote areas, with unclear 
                                                                                                                                         
 56 The idea of carbon rights, as separate from the rights to the land or forest that 
contain the carbon-sequestering biomass, is a complex one. The government of Western 
Australia has explained the concept of carbon rights quite succinctly – carbon rights 
clarify who is entitled to the benefits or liabilities “that arise from changes to the 
atmosphere…caused by carbon sequestration or release.” Carbon Rights in WA – a new 
interest in the land, at 2, available at, 
http://archive.agric.wa.gov.au/objtwr/imported_assets/content/sust/carbon_rights.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). These carbon rights can be created by contract or legislation 
and are an intangible property right that has been suggested may be akin to intellectual 
property rights. Carbon Rights and Redd+, REDD-NET ASIA-PACIFIC, available at, 
http://www.recoftc.org/site/uploads/content/pdf/REDDNet05web_118.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014). A more in-depth look at the intricacies of carbon rights is beyond the 
scope of this Note, but interested readers may find Norton Rose LLP’s 2010 report on 
forest carbon rights in Africa illuminating. See Forest carbon rights in REDD+ 
countries: a snapshot of Africa, NORTON ROSE LLP (Nov. 2010) available at 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/forest-carbon-rights-in-redd-countries-a-
snapshot-of-africa-pdf-994-kb-32479.pdf.; see also, Guide to Carbon Trading Crime, 
supra note 55. 
 57 Guide to Carbon Trading Crime, supra note 55. 
 58 Feds Arrest Californian for Fraudulent Trading of Air Pollution Credits: 
United States v. Sholtz, 24 NO. 25 ANENVLR 11 (July 16, 2004). 
 59 Guide to Carbon Trading Crime, supra note 56. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
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ownership records, and INTERPOL claims the fraud was estimated to 
be worth $80 million.62 
3. Misleading Claims about Environmental or Financial Impacts63 
The relative newness of carbon markets means that investors and 
companies purchasing carbon credits may be at greater risk of being 
taken advantage of.64 In 2008, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission released guide lines to educate companies and 
consumers.65 These materials were intended to ensure companies’ 
claims of carbon credits and carbon neutrality were understandable for 
consumers and not misleading.66 
Regardless of the type of crime or fraud being committed, it is clear 
that carbon credit markets do have the potential to be exploited. As such, 
they need significant oversight and regulation. California, working 
alone, does not seem to be in the place to handle nor bargain for this sort 
of extensive oversight. 
UNETHICAL TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS 
The three stories at the beginning of this note highlight instances in 
which native populations, often without significant resources, have been 
taken advantage of in carbon credit markets. There is significant concern 
over further abuses, both in regard to international markets as well as the 
California scheme under AB-32.67 
One of the main tenets of REDD is the notion of free, prior and 
informed consent for indigenous populations.68 The UN-drafted 
                                                                                                                                         
 62 Id. 
 63 It should be noted that there is no real evidence a federal framework would 
help regulators to combat these sorts of claims. The risk of such crime, however, still 
warrants some brief discussion. 
 64 Guide to Carbon Trading Crime, supra note 56. 
 65 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC Addresses 
Carbon Claims, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION (June 27, 2008) 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/833354. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See generally, RED-MONITOR.ORG, available at http://www.redd-monitor.org/ 
(last viewed Mar. 25, 2015). 
 68 Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, UN-REDD PROGRAMME, 
(Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=871
7&Itemid=53. 
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guidelines acknowledge that indigenous peoples may be affected by 
REDD programs and that they should be consulted throughout the 
process.69 However, there are claims that these very guidelines have 
been violated in “at least ten” of the sixteen countries that currently have 
REDD national programs.70 
Carbon Trade Watch, an association based in Barcelona that 
critiques carbon trading, has collected sources from those ten countries 
that assert violations of the guidelines.71 The sources range from letters 
to the UN or other administering agency (including letters from 
indigenous peoples in Brazil and Mexico to the California Air Resources 
Board regarding AB-32)72 to articles highlighting sustained problems in 
developing effective regulations in places such as Guyana,73 Panama,74 
and Peru.75 
While a few isolated anecdotes, such as those at the beginning of 
this Note, may (perhaps rightfully) be generally discounted when 
                                                                                                                                         
 69 See Launch of REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC), UN-REDD PROGRAMME, available at http://www.un-
redd.org/Launch_of_FPIC_Guidlines/tabid/105976/Default.aspx 
 70 “Violation of Free, Prior and Informed Consent by REDD and REDD,” 
CARBON TRADE WATCH, (May 2013), available at 
http://www.carbontradewatch.org/articles/violation-of-free-prior-and-informed-
consent-by-REDD-and-redd.html. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See “Open letter to the government of California” (Apr. 2013) available at 
http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/04/29/letter-from-brazil-opposing-redd-in-
californias-global-warming-solutions-act-ab32/#more-13816  and “Open Letter of 
Chiapas on the agreement Acre/Chiapas/Brasil- Open letter from Chiapas about the 
Agreement Between the States of Chiapas (Mexico), Acre (Brazil) and California 
(USA)”, (Apr. 2013) available at http://reddeldia.blogspot.mx/2013/04/carta-abierta-de-
chiapas-sobre-el.html (translated by Google). 
 73 “‘Concerns Grow Over Weak Safeguard Implementation,’ Forest Peoples 
Programme on REDD and Safeguards” REDD-MONITOR.ORG, (May 2013) available at 
http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/05/01/concerns-grow-over-weak-safeguard-
implementation-forest-peoples-programme-on-redd-and-safeguards/#more-13827. 
 74 COONAPIP, Panama’s Indigenous Peoples Coordinating Body, Withdraws 
from REDD, REDD-MONITOR.ORG, (Mar. 2013) available at http://www.redd-
monitor.org/2013/03/06/coonapip-panamas-indigenous-peoples-coordinating-body-
withdraws-from-REDD/. 
 75 Indigenous Peoples of the Peruvian Amazon Denounce Failure of the World 
Bank’s Forest Investment Programme in Peru to Respect Their Rights to Lands and 
Territories, FORESPEOPLES.ORG, (Feb. 2013) available at 
http://www.forestpeoples.org/id/topics/forest-investment-programme-
fip/news/2013/02/indigenous-peoples-peruvian-amazon-denounce-fail. 
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looking at such a large international policy or program, the extensive 
problems highlighted by Carbon Trade Watch and organizations such as 
redd-monitor are less-easily ignored.76 Because California is not in a 
position, constitutionally, to bargain for better oversight or compliance 
with nations involved in trading carbon credits, the state’s hands are 
somewhat tied. Instead, the federal government is in a better position to 
ensure that any carbon credits coming to any of the United States from 
overseas are generated through ethical means. 
II. A LOOK AT CALIFORNIA’S AB-32 
In 2006, then-California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed 
into law Assembly Bill 32, titled the Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006 (“AB-32”).77 AB-32 set greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions 
reduction targets for 2020 at 1990 levels – 427 million metric tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2e).78 The state has estimated that, 
on the current trajectory 2020 GHG emissions in the state would be 507 
MMTCO2e.79 A reduction of roughly 80 MMTCO2e, effectively the 
reduction of one-sixth of the currently estimated 2020 GHG emissions, 
will be necessary to reach the AB-32-mandated goals.80 
AB-32 amended the California Health and Safety Code, and set 
seven specific tasks for the California Air Resource Board (ARB): 81 
1) Prepare a scoping plan for cost-effective technological 
reductions in GHG emissions from sources in California,82 
2) Determine the state’s GHG emission level from 1990, to serve 
as the limit for 2020.83 
3) Adopt regulations that require “reporting and verification” of 
GHG emissions,84 
                                                                                                                                         
 76 See generally, redd-monitor.org. 
 77 Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY AIR RESOURCE BOARD, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm 
(Aug. 5, 2014). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Status of Scoping Plan Recommended Measures, ARB, available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/status_of_scoping_plan_measures.pdf (last 
viewed 3/25/15). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Assembly Bill 32, supra, note 77. 
 82 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561. 
 83 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550. 
 84 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530. 
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4) Identify by June 30, 2007 early action GHG emission reduction 
measures and adopt by January 1, 2010 regulations to implement those 
measures,85 
5) Convene an environmental justice advisory committee to advise 
in any matter pertinent to AB-32,86 
6) Convene an Economic and Technology Advancement Advisory 
Committee to advise the ARB on matters regarding implementation of 
technological GHG emission reductions,87 and 
7) Adopt regulation that creates a “system of market-based 
declining annual aggregate emissions limits” for sources of GHG 
emissions.88 
The ARB accomplished the first six tasks listed above on time, and 
in 2011 adopted cap-and-trade regulations.89 Those cap-and-trade 
regulations, which include language allowing California companies to 
use carbon credits generated by REDD plans, are the only portion of 
AB-32 germane to this note and are thus due a further exploration.90 
CALIFORNIA’S CAP-AND-TRADE 
California’s cap-and-trade program works on a basis of allowances 
and purchased credits – effectively each can be surrendered to the state 
by a covered entity91 in exchange for having emitted one metric ton of 
CO2 equivalent (CO2e) GHG gasses.92 If a covered entity wishes to 
                                                                                                                                         
 85 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560.5. 
 86 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38591. 
 87 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38591(d). 
 88 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(c). 
 89 Assembly Bill 32, supra, note 77. 
 90 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95993; The ARB has proposed amendments to the 
regulation, but as of the writing of this note none of the changes proposed seem to 
affect the international component of the cap-and-trade scheme. A reader-friendly 
version of the proposed 2013 amendments is available from the ARB website at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/c-t-reg-reader-2013.pdf (last viewed Mar. 25, 
2015). 
 91 Covered entities are defined in CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17 § 95811. In general, 
covered entities include things like cement, glass, and iron and steel producers, along 
with petroleum refiners, fuel suppliers and electricity generating facilities. Most 
covered entities have an inclusion threshold of 25,000 metric tons of CO2e per year 
under § 95812. 
 92 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 959856. 
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emit more CO2e GHG gasses than its allowance93 permits, the entity can 
purchase credits at auction94 or by trade between covered entities.95 A 
covered entity may also acquire and surrender sector-based credits from 
other programs recognized by the ARB, including credits from REDD 
programs and any other approved international program.96 
In layman’s terms, a covered entity that wishes to emit one metric 
ton of GHG must either have a state-granted allowance to emit that ton, 
trade for another entity’s allowance or have a one-ton credit from an 
approved accreditation program. 
As the thrust of this Note is focused on the mechanisms for REDD 
credits, and those created through other international carbon credit 
programs, the remainder of this section on AB-32 will focus on sector-
based offset credits and their limitations. 97 
SECTOR-BASED OFFSET CREDITS 
The ARB has promulgated regulations for allowing international 
sector-based offset credits in the California cap-and-trade scheme.98 
These credits, generated either by the reduction or avoidance of GHG 
emissions or through carbon sequestration by a specific economic 
sector, must be generated in developing countries or subnational 
jurisdictions within those countries.99 
                                                                                                                                         
 93 The difference between “allowances” and “credits” is subtle, but important. 
Allowances are the amount of GHG a covered entity can legally emit. Credits are legal 
fictions that let a covered entity to emit pollution beyond their allowance. For example, 
if a fictional company had an allowance that let them emit ten tons of GHG, they could 
purchase a one-ton credit and legally emit eleven tons of GHG. 
 94 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95910. 
 95 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95921. 
 96 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, §§ 95990-95995. 
 97 The exact amount each covered entity is granted in allowance, the costs and 
mechanisms for trading allowances, and the methods for verifying emissions are 
incredibly complex. They are also not particularly germane to the thrust of this Note 
and will be ignored for the sake of simplicity and readability. For more information on 
those, and many other, details, see CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, §§ 95800-96022. 
 98 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95991. 
 99 Id. The generation of credits through GHG emission avoidance– and the 
bargaining/monitoring that would be necessary to effectively oversee those credits – 
may also raise questions regarding California’s constitutional ability to bargain with 
foreign jurisdictions. However, the focus of this note is on carbon sequestration and the 
credits raised by sequestration – reduction or avoidance of GHG emissions is thus 
beyond the scope of this paper but could be a fruitful avenue of future research. 
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The ARB has created procedures for approving such sector-based 
credits,100 but included a pre-approved rubberstamp for sector-based 
credits from REDD plans.101 This means that REDD credits generated in 
developing nations can enter the California cap-and-trade system, as 
described above, without any further oversight from the ARB. 
Non-REDD credits may be approved based upon the requirements 
set-up by the ARB.102 The requirements for credit-producing programs 
are more exacting than that for the host jurisdiction. Under the ARB’s 
current regulations, an approved program must have a “transparent” 
system for monitoring, reporting, verifying and maintaining accounting 
for the entire sectors emission reductions.103 The program must also set 
quantifiable offset criteria,104 a system for determining baselines and 
performance in relation to those baselines,105 and a “means for public 
participation and consultation” when designing a program.106 
These requirements may seem thorough, but as seen in the 
experiences of the UN, having standards for verification and 
transparency does not necessarily mean that those standards are 
particularly effective.107 
The ARB regulations require host jurisdictions to have a clear plan 
for emission reductions.108 This emission reduction plan is the only 
requirement for “host jurisdictions” under California regulations, every 
other provision therein outlines the requirements of sector-based 
crediting programs.109 Presumably, this requirement for host 
jurisdictions is separate and distinct from the requirements for programs 
(which are discussed below) and focused on making sure the 
government body responsible for the sector from which the credits are 
generated is on-board and actively engaged in GHG emission 
                                                                                                                                         
 100 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95992. 
 101 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95993. 
 102 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95994. 
 103 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95994(a)(2). 
 104 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95994(a)(3). 
 105 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95994(a)(4). 
 106 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95994(a)(5). 
 107 See Vidal, supra note 48. 
 108 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95994(a)(1). 
 109 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT.. 17, § 95993. 
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reductions. As discussed in Part III of this note, this could lead to 
constitutional problems under the dormant-treaty power.110 
SECTOR-BASED OFFSET LIMITS 
The ARB has set limits on the number of offset credits an entity 
can use to meet compliance obligations.111 Currently, covered entities 
can use offset credits to cover up to two percent of their obligation, with 
that number rising to four percent in budget year 2018.112 While two 
percent of an entity’s obligation may not, on its face, seem like a 
significant portion it is important to keep the scale in mind. Assuming 
the 80 MMTCO2e number referred to above is the annual amount the 
state needs to reduce emissions by 2020, covered entities would be 
allowed to offset 1.6 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent through the 
use of REDD credits each year. According to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), it would take over 41 million tree seedlings 
grown for ten years to sequester that much carbon.113 Put another way – 
it would take over 1.3 million acres of US forests to sequester that much 
carbon.114 
III. CALIFORNIA’S TREATY-MAKING PROBLEM 
The Constitution, through Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2, has 
reserved the power to enter into treaties for the federal government– 
namely through the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.115 The Constitution specifically prohibits states from entering 
                                                                                                                                         
 110 See infra, Matthew Schaefer, Constraints on State-Level Foreign Policy: (Re) 
Justifying, Refining and Distinguishing the Dorman Foreign Affairs Doctrine, 41 
SETON HALL L. REV. 201, 204 (2011). 
 111 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95854(c). 
 112 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95854(b) (referring to compliance periods laid out 
in CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95841). The math required to interpret §95854 can be 
daunting –effectively the regulation allows a covered entity to use compliance 
instruments (including sector-based offset credits) for 8% of the total compliance 
obligation. § 95854(c) then limits sector-based offset credits to one quarter of that 8% 
for the first and second compliance periods (running through budget year 2017) and one 
half of the 8% for the third compliance period starting in budget year 2018. 
 113 Calculated using the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator, U.S. 
Environmenal Protection Agency http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-
resources/calculator.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 114 Id. 
 115 U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 2, CL. 2. 
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into treaties, alliances or confederations.116 However, as Professor 
Edward T. Swaine points out, state and local jurisdictions regularly 
engage with foreign polities in ways that seem suspiciously like 
diplomacy – including entering into “symbolic political ties…trade and 
investment missions [and] bilateral and multilateral agreements.”117 
So, where then, is the problem for California? And why can the 
state not work with foreign governments to ensure that any carbon 
credits generated are done so to the satisfaction of state regulations? 
The answer lies in the dormant treaty power invested in the federal 
government– namely that the dormant treaty power effectively precludes 
any state from bargaining with foreign powers on any matter of national 
concern.118 This interpretation of the Constitutional powers of the 
federal government has not always been clearly elucidated, or followed, 
but was first laid out by the Supreme Court in Zschernig v. Miller.119 
Recent cases, including three that arose from controversies in California, 
have more-clearly defined the dormant treaty power.120 
This analysis will discuss those more-recent cases in the context of 
the dormant treaty power. However, first it seems prudent to discuss, 
from a theoretical perspective, why California would need to enter into a 
negotiation or bargain with a foreign government in order to sufficiently 
monitor the creation of carbon credits. 
CALIFORNIA’S NEED TO BARGAIN 
California, if they were to assure the credits used in their cap-and-
trade scheme are legitimate and created without abuses of native 
populations, would certainly have to interact with foreign governments 
or multi-national organizations (such as the U.N.). Oversight of 
programs, in an attempt to verify that the credits are generated in an 
                                                                                                                                         
 116 U.S. CONST. ART I, § 10, CL. 1. 
 117 Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant 
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L. J. 1127, 1130 (2000). 
 118 Matthew Schaefer, Constraints on State-Level Foreign Policy: (Re) Justifying, 
Refining and Distinguishing the Dorman Foreign Affairs Doctrine, 41 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 201, 204 (2011). 
 119 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 120 See generally, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 
2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art 
at Pasadena, 592 F. 3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 
(2003). 
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efficient manner is required at some level.121 If California were to 
require direct oversight of the programs, this would clearly be a form of 
bargaining.  For example, California directly inserting itself into the 
practices of how Brazil manages its forests in exchange for allowing 
Brazilian carbon credits entrance into California’s carbon market would 
be a clear form of negotiation or bargaining. 
But what if California, unilaterally, creates a set of very specific 
requirements for carbon credit programs that countries are free to 
follow? Is this a form of bargaining?  According to Professor Swaine 
this would constitute a form of “indirect bargaining,” which is also 
constitutionally problematic.122 It appears that the ARB’s requirement 
that any jurisdiction hosting a sector-based offset crediting program 
already have a “plan for reducing emissions” could be considered a form 
of indirect bargaining.123 
Indeed the form any bargaining takes is likely irrelevant – states are 
not allowed, under the dormant treaty clause, to negotiate with a foreign 
government either directly or indirectly.124 Direct negotiation is fairly 
self-explanatory, but indirect negotiation is perhaps a bit more nuanced. 
Effectively, the prohibition on indirect negotiation would mean 
California would be precluded from creating a unilateral standard with 
the purpose of changing the behavior of a foreign body, enticing them to 
fall in line in order for their carbon credits to be acceptable in 
California.125 
So, either by direct oversight or through standards that would entice 
foreign bodies to comply in order to receive approval, California has a 
need to interact with foreign governments in a way that would be 
considered bargaining if they wanted to ensure the quality of the carbon 
credits entering their market.126 
                                                                                                                                         
 121 Or, perhaps more pertinently, that the credits are actually generated at all, and 
not a creation of double-counting or dubious claims about the amount of carbon 
captured. 
 122 Swaine, supra note 117 at 1138. 
 123 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, § 95994(a)(1). 
 124 Schaefer, supra note 118 at 224. 
 125 Id. 
 126 The discussion of indirect negotiation, and its standing in relationship to the 
dormant treaty clause, is more nuanced than outlined above. The next section will 
tackle some of the cases dealing with indirect negotiation and the power of the states. 
For now, it is stipulated that California needs some form of leverage or bargaining 
power in order to get foreign governments to conform to any unilateral standards they 
set and the discussion on why those regulations, were California to enact them, are 
unconstitutional is in the next section. 
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INDIRECT NEGOTIATION AND AB-32 
It is clear that California does not have the Constitutional power to 
directly negotiate and enter a treaty or alliance with a foreign body over 
how they manage their forests in exchange for entrance into California’s 
carbon credit market.127 Article I of the Constitution says “No State shall 
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”128 A directly 
negotiated deal, such as getting a foreign body to regulate their carbon 
credit creation in a specific way in exchange for letting those credits 
enter California’s market, would clearly then be a violation. 
The Supreme Court has not heard a case relating to carbon credits 
and the effects of the dormant treaty clause, but Zschernig does provide 
an excellent example of a state’s attempt at indirect negotiation being 
struck down.129 In Zschernig, Oregon has passed a law that limited the 
inheritance rights of non-US citizens – namely, a citizen of a country 
could only inherit property from an Oregon resident if US citizens could 
inherit from that country.130 Inheritance laws are traditionally an area of 
state regulation,131 however the Court ruled the law unconstitutional, and 
held that it illustrated “the dangers which are involved if each State…is 
permitted to establish its own foreign policy.”132 
                                                                                                                                         
 127 As is common when dealing with complicated Constitutional questions, word 
choice is important (though often cumbersome). For example, California could, with 
approval of the Senate, enter into an “Agreement or Compact” with a foreign nation 
(U.S. CONST. ART I, § 10, cl. 3). California has not received (nor, as far as this author 
can discern, sought) Senate approval for any international agreements in regards to AB-
32. Whether any arrangement would fall under the definition of “treaty” or “agreement” 
is therefore not relevant at this point. 
 128 U.S. CONST. ART I, § 10, CL. 1. 
 129 See generally, Zschernig, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 130 Id. It is possible, as Professor Swaine noted that some have argued, that 
Zschernig is a very narrow decision, confined to the facts of the case which lead 
Oregon probate courts to make decisions based upon the prevailing political positions 
of the day and the policies of foreign governments. However, the more-recent cases, 
especially those coming from the 9th Circuit and discussed in the following section, 
point to a broader field preemption by the federal government of foreign affairs. Cases 
involving laws that required disclosure of insurance policies (Garamendi), the return of 
art looted by Nazis (Von Saher), and insurance actions by victims of the Armenian 
Genocide (Versicherung) all invoked the dormant foreign affairs powers of the federal 
government and were deemed invalid. 
 131 Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 1621, 1653 (2008). 
 132 Id. at 441. 
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The Court, in 2003, laid out the principles of Zschernig once again 
in American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi.133 Though, in the end, the 
outcome of the case was determined under a different standard,134 the 
Court did say that state actions, which would have more than “incidental 
effect on foreign affairs”, are preempted if they do not concern 
“traditional state interests.”135 
Following Garamendi, the 9th Circuit, in 2010, used a field 
preemption analysis to invalidate a California law regarding the statute 
of limitations for Holocaust victims, or their decedents, making claims 
on stolen or looted art.136 The 9th Circuit then analyzed whether the 
statute in controversy concerned a traditional state responsibility.137 The 
9th Circuit held that while regulating property, as was purportedly the 
purpose of the law in question, is generally a state responsibility, the 
true purpose of the law, since it addressed only claims of Holocaust 
victims, actually impacted foreign affairs.138 
This, it would seem, is analogous to California’s situation if they 
were to create a more-stringent regulatory process.139 California’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 133 American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 134 The issue in Garamendi was found to be a direct conflict between standing 
federal foreign policy and the California statute. This allowed the Court to bypass an in-
depth examination of the field preemption, or dormant treaty, power of the federal 
government. As there is currently no federal regulation of international carbon credits, 
there is no direct conflict in regards to AB-32. 
 135 Garamendi, at 398. The Court here is unclear whether Zschernig’s result means 
state laws are invalid any time they have more than an “incidental effect” on foreign 
affairs, or if they are only invalid when they have an effect and do not concern 
“traditional state interests.” Future decisions by the 9th Circuit interpreted Garamendi 
to holding that if a state statute does concern traditional state interests, it may not be 
invalid even if it does effect foreign affairs in an area that does not have direct conflict 
with current foreign policy. The author’s reading of Garamendi did not produce such a 
clear understanding, but this Note will continue under the understanding that the 9th 
Circuit is correct in its analysis. 
 136 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 963 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id., (citing similar decisions in Garamendi; Zschernig; Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), and Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 
692 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 139 It should be noted (though, this is just a draft and should be worked out better 
in the final paper, hopefully) that the current regulations do not seem to violate the 
dormant treaty clause. They just are ineffective, instead. If they were to be re-crafted to 
be effective (something that will be discussed in the as-yet unfinished section on AB-
32) they would then be problematic. 
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regulations create a carbon market in the state, which is undoubtedly an 
area of state responsibility. However, if California’s regulations were to 
effectively control the manner in which foreign governing bodies 
managed their carbon-sinks and the way in which carbon credits were 
produced, this would seem to be a clear case of indirect bargaining in an 
area that is generally not within the realm of state responsibility. 
The 9th Circuit re-affirmed their position the dormant treaty clause 
(or, “dormant foreign affairs preemption”) in Movsesian v. Victoria 
Versicherung AG.140 Here, the court mirrored its decision in Von Saher – 
first noting that the facial concern of the law in question was a matter of 
state concern before holding that the law was also distinctly related to 
foreign affairs.141 
In Movsesian, the 9th Circuit also stressed that the original dormant 
treaty case, Zschernig, was decided in part because law required “value-
laden judgments” of foreign nations by members of a state court.142 
This, perhaps, adds another element that would further-invalidate any 
more-robust version of AB-32 regulations. Under a hypothetical AB-32 
system that required more-effective controls on carbon-credit 
production, a decision-maker at a regulatory agency would be tasked 
with not only assessing the technical specifications of carbon-credits 
(which would not be particularly value-laden, though it may violate 
other aspects of the dormant foreign affairs clause discussed above), but 
would also be responsible for assessing the impact on various 
indigenous populations that might be effected. This second half of the 
process would likely have non-objective, and thus value-laden, 
components that would violate the standard set by Zschernig and 
elucidated in Movsesian above. 
IV. THE SOLUTION 
As any attempt to amend AB-32 to require either direct oversight 
and/or negotiation with foreign governments or indirect negotiation 
                                                                                                                                         
 140 Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F. 3d 1067, at 1072 (9th Cir. 
2012) (holding that “even in the absence of any express federal policy, a state law still 
may be preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine if it intrudes on the field of foreign 
affairs without addressing a traditional state responsibility.) 
 141 Id. (holding that a law subjecting foreign insurance companies to lawsuit in 
California on the basis of their holding policies for victims of the Armenian Genocide 
effected foreign affairs). 
 142 Id. 
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through more-stringent regulations that came to the same effect would 
be invalid under the dormant treaty clause, what is the solution for 
solving the defects in California’s cap-and-trade regulation? 
Broadly, the solution143 is for Congress to enact legislation creating 
a framework for approval and oversight of any foreign carbon-credits 
entering into state-level markets.144 Before delving into a solution, 
however, it may prove fruitful to look at past attempts to pass legislation 
related to carbon-markets. 
PAST, BUT NOT PASSED, ATTEMPTS AT LEGISLATION 
Two different bills came before Congress in 2009 related to carbon 
markets. The more successful of the two was the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA) that was started in the House 
of Representatives.145 The less successful bill started in the Senate and 
was called the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009 
(CEJAPA).146 
The ACESA managed to get passed in House on June 26, 2009, but 
died in the Senate shortly thereafter.147 The CEJAPA, meanwhile, was 
introduced in the Senate in November of 2009, but never made it to the 
House.148 The language used in the two bills is largely identical, 
including the sections dealing with international offset credits.149 
The bills both ultimately failed, and media surrounding the bills 
blamed the usual candidates – a broken political system,150 a struggling 
                                                                                                                                         
 143 At least the solution proposed by the author in this Note. 
 144 It could be that the framework would also apply to any carbon credits created 
domestically. However, one would assume that any domestically-created credits are 
less likely to run into the issues of corruption, mismanagement, and abuse of indigenous 
people than those created overseas. We do not have the large tracts of remote land here 
that might found in, say, the Amazon basin in South America. So, for the purposes of 
this Note, the focus will be on international credits. 
 145 See H.R. 2454 (111th): American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
GOVTRACKS.US, available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454 (last 
viewed Mar. 25, 2015). 
 146 See S. 1733 (111th): Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, 
GOVTRACKS.US, available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s1733 (last 
viewed Mar. 25,2015). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Compare, HR 2454 §743, with S 1733 §744. 
 150 David Roberts, “Why Did the Climate Bill Fail?”, GRIST.ORG, (July 2010) 
available at http://grist.org/article/2010-07-26-why-did-the-climate-bill-fail/. 
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economy,151 poor messaging and communication,152 and poorly written 
policy.153Although both of the bills failed as a whole, there did not 
appear to be an international offset portion of the bills that drew specific 
ire. Perhaps, then, that section deserves more scrutiny and can provide a 
blueprint for future legislative solutions. 
The bills would have required the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)154 to work with the Secretary 
of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) to promulgate the regulations for 
international credits.155 The regulations would have restricted credits to 
developing countries that were part of a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement with the United States that applied to the credits.156 This 
provision would have allowed the United States to guarantee that 
effective safeguards were in place to promote an efficient and ethical 
carbon-crediting program.157 
Equally importantly, the proposed legislation did not rubber-stamp 
REDD or any other international accreditation programs. Rather, the bill 
required that the Administrator of the EPA verify that any international 
programs met or exceeded the standards of US credits.158 These rules 
also would have applied to international offset credits.159 The bill also 
required the Administrator of the EPA to ensure “by whatever means 
appropriate” that no credits were double counted in other carbon credit 
schemes.160 
In regards to the treatment of indigenous peoples, the proposed 
legislation required “consultation with, and full participation of,” local 
indigenous populations as “partners and primary stakeholders.”161 
                                                                                                                                         
 151 Id. 
 152 Dante Atkins, “Not-so-slick Messaging” DAILY KOS, (July 25 2010) 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/07/25/885743/-Not-so-slick-messaging. 
 153 Lee Wasserman, “Four Ways to Kill a Climate Bill” New York Times (July 25, 
2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/opinion/26wasserman.html?_r=0. 
 154 See 2009 CONG US HR 2454 § 2(1) (defining “Administrator” as the 
Administrator of the EPA). 
 155 Id. at § 743(a). 
 156 Id. at § 743(b)(2). 
 157 There were further steps taken ensure the country issuing the credits was truly a 
“developing country” (and that the correct types of biomass were present (§743 (C)). 
 158 Supra note 149 at § 743(d)(1). 
 159 Id. at § 743(e). 
 160 Id. at § 743(g). 
 161 Id. at §743 (e)(1)(E)(iii). 
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Profits and dividends were also to be shared equitably among local 
communities and indigenous populations.162 
GOING FORWARD 
It appears the bones of the solution have already had two chances 
before the US Senate. The language in the ACESA and CEJAPA 
concerning international carbon credits significantly addresses the 
concerns raised by this Note in regards to UN REDD being 
rubberstamped in California. 
Perhaps the one addition that would be necessary would be 
language either a) ensuring that verification of international credits 
would take place by trained, knowledgeable personnel and/or b) 
enabling the EPA to singlehandedly suspend any program or disbar any 
verification agency that was caught attempting to circumvent US 
regulations. 
Not only does the language of the ACESA and CEJAPA seem 
effective, but it also may be more-politically viable as a standalone 
measure than as part of an omnibus climate change bill. If the general 
stereotype is that political right is going to be pro-state rights and pro-
industry while the political left is pro-environmental protection, a bill 
that does its best to protect the environment and indigenous peoples 
while also allowing states to create carbon markets tailored to their own 
industries could be popular. 
V. CONCLUSION 
California’s desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, curb 
deforestation in developing nations and promote potential solutions for 
curtailing global warming are laudable. Unfortunately, the state acting 
alone cannot efficiently and effectively institute a cap-and-trade 
program that includes carbon-credit offsets from international sources. 
The state does not have the constitutional power, under the dormant 
treaty power theory, to provide effective oversight of the international 
carbon-creation process. By giving blanket acceptance to carbon credits 
created under the REDD program California’s cap-and-trade regime, as 
outlined by regulations proposed by the state’s Air Resource Board, 
exposes the state’s market to carbon credits created fraudulently or via 
unethical treatment of indigenous populations. 
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 CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS, BUT AT WHAT COST? 
Instead of letting California go it alone, the federal government 
should intervene. By creating an effective monitoring process and 
allowing only approved carbon credits to be traded in state-level offset 
programs, the federal government can assure to Californians, and 
residents of other states that create similar programs in the future, that 
the carbon credits traded are both legitimate and created without the 
unethical treatment of indigenous populations overseas. 
